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Introduction
Few policies of the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror have 
inspired more rebuke by U.S. allies and been seized upon by U.S. adver-
saries more than that of extraordinary rendition. Simple in its basic con-
cept, yet bungled in execution, the U.S. Government has used 
extraordinary rendition with zeal since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The 
primary intent of extraordinary rendition is to remove terrorists from the 
streets and inhibit their ability to plan and execute terrorist operations. 
Abstract
This article examines the United States Government policy of extraordi-
nary rendition as a response to terrorism. The paper provides a working 
definition of the term, outlines why it has become controversial, and uses 
case studies to examine success and failures of extraordinary rendition in 
practice. The paper concludes with lessons learned—more specifically, 
policy amendments—that are necessary to keep extraordinary rendition 
as a viable tool for the Obama Administration and mitigate political fall-
out against the United States from both its allies and enemies. This paper 
argues that extraordinary rendition provides flexibility to policymakers to 
detain terrorists in cases where an attack may be forthcoming and when 
other approved legal processes are slow to react. Therefore, instead of 
ending extraordinary renditions altogether, the United States should 
reevaluate how it implements the policy on a tactical, operational, and 
strategic level and amend it based on the recommendations put forward 
in this article.
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Proponents of the policy argue that it effectively removes terrorists from 
the streets and makes America and the world safer. Detractors often 
retort by saying the policy completely undermines greater U.S. foreign 
policy goals, is not in the spirit of U.S. and international law, and is linked 
directly with the torture of detainees.
A full accounting of the policy's effects has yet to be undertaken—or pro-
vided—by the United States Government, but lessons can be learned from 
its use over the past decade. It is imperative to learn these lessons now 
because the U.S. will continue to be judged and closely scrutinized on how 
it implements controversial counterterrorism policies in the future. How-
ever, U.S. officials should be careful not to dismiss the policy out of hand 
because unpredictable failures do not conclusively undermine its overall 
efficacy. With several adjustments to current policy, extraordinary rendi-
tion can continue to be a useful tool in the fight against terrorism. The 
purpose of this paper is to define the controversy surrounding extraordi-
nary rendition policy, use several case studies to assess its overall efficacy 
as a counterterrorism tool for the United States Government, and put for-
ward several recommendations to strengthen the policy for use in the 
future.
Extraordinary Rendition: A Working Definition
Rendition is defined simply as any time a fugitive is surrendered by one 
country and given to another.2 It should not to be confused with 
extradition, which is a subset of rendition characterized by a legal process 
and considered to be the official vehicle to transfer suspects in custody 
between foreign governments.3 Extraordinary rendition, or irregular 
rendition, is a policy where individuals known to be members or affiliates 
of terrorist organizations are seized and covertly transferred to a third-
country detention facility for debriefing.4 The process is extrajudicial, 
done in secret, and typically not carried out exclusively by U.S. 
personnel.5
Targeted individuals are often seized by local authorities in a particular 
country at the behest of—or based on the intelligence from—personnel 
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) or the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). The suspects are then 
transported using U.S. assets to one of many destinations, including 
Egypt, Syria, Romania, Jordan, Poland, or Afghanistan. Some individuals 
are destined for known prisons operated by host governments, but others 
are held in "black sites" which are operated by the U.S. Government in 
foreign territories.6 The primary intent of extraordinary rendition is to 
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pull terrorists off the streets. In this way it differs from simple covert ren-
dition because the individuals are usually not destined for a courtroom of 
any kind, but rather they are to be detained and interrogated indefinitely, 
often without official charges filed against them.7
What Makes It So Extraordinary?
Extraordinary rendition is not extraordinary because it is a new or novel 
concept. It is extraordinary because, as a counterterrorism tool, it circum-
vents official legal structures and processes to detain known or suspected 
terrorists. The extraordinary rendition program in its current incarnation 
began in 1995 during the Clinton Administration and was designed by 
CIA officials heading the Usama bin Ladin Issue Station (originally code-
named Alec Station).8 Its primary goals were to take individuals off the 
streets that were known to be planning or have planned terrorist opera-
tions and to seize evidence in their possession at the time of capture.9
At this time, Presidential approval was required for an extraordinary ren-
dition to occur; and, according to officials involved, interrogation of ren-
dered individuals by U.S. Government personnel was not part of the 
program.10 Also, captives were only to be transferred to countries where 
they were wanted for a criminal offense. After 9/11, the policy was 
amended by lifting the above restrictions and allowed for a U.S. role dur-
ing interrogations.11 Both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administra-
tions sought assurances that foreign governments would not torture 
detained individuals, but the veracity of these claims, and the expectation 
that host governments would actually comply, is questionable.12 Over 
time, the program shifted from using an interagency approach to a largely 
CIA-managed program based on a classified Presidential Directive issued 
by President Bush.13
What Has Made It Controversial?
In theory, extraordinary rendition is not overly controversial, but U.S. 
management and execution of the policy has created strong opposition 
from human rights groups. For example, Ramzi Yousef was a target of 
U.S. rendition who was openly tried and convicted in a U.S. court of law 
for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Yousef's rendition 
and conviction faced little opposition because the moral imperative of a 
free society to protect its people from terrorism is widely accepted. 
Extraordinary renditions—where individuals simply disappear on "ghost 
planes," are never charged with crimes, and are detained indefinitely—are 
what troubles most observers.14
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During the early years of the program, very few people even knew extraor-
dinary renditions were taking place. As of 1998, thirteen suspected inter-
national terrorists had been detained and delivered to the United States to 
stand trial.15 However, the program was expanded significantly after 9/11 
because the political landscape had changed and the Bush administration 
was obliged to take increasingly aggressive actions to combat terrorism. 
These renditions only became public when exposed by inquisitive journal-
ists. In 2004, then-CIA Director George Tenet testified to the 9/11 Com-
mission that about seventy total renditions had occurred since 9/11, and 
all were sent to foreign countries.16 Later, it was determined that in cer-
tain cases, the United States Government seized persons and transferred 
them to countries where torture was common in detention facilities, lead-
ing some to call extraordinary rendition policy "outsourcing torture."17
Critics of extraordinary rendition commonly argue that U.S. treaty obliga-
tions, particularly Article III of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, clearly 
states that "[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."18 They are also 
keen to point out that specific individuals were held at U.S.-operated 
"black sites" in foreign locations, subsequently interrogated, and in all 
probability tortured by U.S. personnel, which would be a clear violation of 
U.S. laws.19 U.S. Government excesses in this regard are widely docu-
mented, particularly with respect to the use of stress positions, walling, 
and water boarding, and their legality is questionable. It is not the pur-
pose of this paper to discuss torture, but rather the specific counterterror-
ism tool known as extraordinary rendition and its effect on national 
security policy writ large.
The controversy between extraordinary rendition and torture is a tangled 
web of legal nuance, and there is truly no clear-cut answer on the legality 
of either. However, as Princeton Professor Emeritus and just-war theorist 
Michael Walzer argues, "it is important to stress that the moral reality of 
war is not fixed by the actual activities of soldiers, but by the opinions of 
mankind."20 Today, it is clear that a policy of inter arma silent leges (in 
time of war, law is silent) is unacceptable. So, too, is the solicitation of cre-
ative legal opinions that seek to contravene the spirit of known domestic 
and international laws. Having squandered much of the political good will 
that came as a result of 9/11 by fighting a questionable war in Iraq, the 
U.S. will continue to be judged and scrutinized on how it implements con-
troversial policies. Consequently, it is imperative to wholly understand 
the benefits and costs of extraordinary policies using case studies of suc-
cesses and failures.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/3
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.2</p>
Extraordinary Rendition and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
19
Whether to Extraordinarily Render Someone: 
Evidence from Case Studies
Proponents of rendition policy are likely to point to notable successes or 
rely on the mantra that successes can't be revealed to the public. Detrac-
tors of the policy will highlight the most embarrassing episodes of mis-
taken identity and try to draw broad conclusions that undermine the 
policy as a whole. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should not expect zero 
defects when a particular counterterrorism policy is implemented, even 
though the consequences of failure can be politically detrimental. There-
fore, the next section will examine the benefits and drawbacks of extraor-
dinary rendition using several case studies in order to determine its 
efficacy overall.
Successful Extraordinary Renditions
There have been many successful extraordinary renditions, most having 
occurred in the years following 9/11. Notorious terrorists such as Khalid 
Shaikh Muhammed (KSM), Abu Zubaydah, Ibn Shaikh al-Libi, Walid Bin 
'Attash, Muhammed Saad Iqbal Madni, and Encep Nuraman (nom de 
guerre—Hambali) were all apprehended and rendered as part of the U.S. 
program. Successful extraordinary renditions may yield valuable intelli-
gence that enhances the ability of the United States Government to under-
stand terrorist leadership or networks and derail possible future plans 
after thorough debriefing. Notwithstanding what happens after the sus-
pects are apprehended, the successful cases analyzed here are unique in 
that the removal of these individuals from the street dealt a debilitating 
blow to their terrorist networks in the near- and mid-term.21
Khalid Shaikh Muhammad (KSM): The 9-11 Mastermind
KSM, known as the self-proclaimed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was 
detained in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on March 1, 2003.22 KSM was a known 
al-Qaida (AQ) operator and wanted terrorist for over fifteen years prior to 
his arrest. He was a known associate of Usama bin Ladin and Ramzi 
Yousef. At the time of his capture, he was a head AQ operational planner, 
military committee leader, and media operations director for Al-Sahab.23 
In addition to the litany of operations he lays claim to, he was also said to 
be plotting attacks against the United Kingdom just prior to his arrest and 
rendition.24 KSM's extraordinary rendition yielded intelligence with 
regard to the structure and future plans of AQ, and he was the highest 
positioned AQ operative ever captured. His knowledge of the AQ network, 
as well as intimate details about past operations, contributed to greater 
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understanding of AQ and ongoing transnational terrorism efforts. With-
out a doubt, KSM's rendition and subsequent detention can be considered 
a major victory for United States counterterrorism efforts.
Abu Zubaydah: The Facilitator
Abu Zubaydah was arrested in Faisalabad, Pakistan on March 28, 2002.25 
Zubaydah, a native of both Palestine and Saudi Arabia, was a known AQ 
affiliate and operational planner responsible for facilitating the move-
ment of key radical Islamic ideologues around the globe to support train-
ing and missions.26 He was also the overseer of the Khalden Group of 
terror training camps located in Afghanistan for nearly five years.27 
Zubaydah is most notable for his admission that KSM was a primary plan-
ner behind the 9-11 attacks. While Zubaydah's role in AQ has likely been 
overstated, U.S. and foreign intelligence operatives had been tracking 
Zubaydah for nearly twenty years prior to his arrest as he facilitated oper-
ations in the terrorist underworld. His detention dealt a debilitating blow 
to AQ operations in the near- and mid-term, and his rendition provided 
the United States Government with significant intelligence related to the 
structure and leadership of AQ.
A Policy in Question: Botched Extraordinary 
Renditions
Although the amount of known botched extraordinary rendition mistakes 
is few, these failures overshadow rendition successes and have a signifi-
cant effect on how the policy is viewed by critics. Commonly agreed-upon 
failed renditions often include Khaled al Masri, Abu Omar, and Maher 
Arar. Certain organizations have seized on these unfortunate missteps to 
broadly condemn extraordinary rendition policy because the failures 
undermine the general United States' contention that it, as a nation, is 
morally superior to the terrorists it fights.28 Indeed, these failures do 
expose weaknesses of execution, such as poor tradecraft, public relations 
difficulties, and the challenges of identifying actual terrorists. The failures 
have also strained and jeopardized U.S. relations between key allies in the 
war against terrorism.
Khaled al Masri: A Public Relations Failure
One of the most public failures of extraordinary rendition to date has been 
the capture and detention of Khaled al Masri. Al Masri, a Lebanese-born 
German citizen, was captured while vacationing in Macedonia in 2003.29 
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Al Masri's detention quickly became a rallying cry for anti-rendition crit-
ics, and the failure of the United States Government to contradict his pub-
lic statements has led to a public relations fiasco.
Allegedly, in court documents filed by al Masri and his legal team, al 
Masri was detained and tortured for nearly six months by the United 
States in Afghanistan.30 He was released in 2004 without explanation, let 
alone any specific criminal charges, in Albania on the side of a moun-
tain.31 Al Masri has since returned to Germany and filed legal action 
against the United States for cruel, inhumane, and degrading treat-
ment.32 Concurrently, the German Government launched a full investiga-
tion of his case and learned many details of the covert extraordinary 
rendition policy, even after U.S. officials insisted that the Germans not 
pursue an inquiry.33
Al Masri's story has garnered significant attention from the press, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the German Government. 
Some argue that he is one of nearly three dozen so-called "erroneous ren-
ditions," where the U.S. intelligence community simply picked up the 
wrong person based on poor intelligence.34 Recently, the U.S. Supreme 
Court supported the White House's legal argument against al Masri—
essentially a non-argument by way of the state secrets privilege—and 
decided not to hear his case, which has fueled further speculation and dis-
content toward the policy of extraordinary rendition.
In nearly all aspects, al Masri's case was mishandled by the United States 
Government. It was learned early in his detention that he was probably 
the victim of mistaken identity.35 However, instead of developing a coher-
ent repatriation plan with German authorities, the United States pro-
ceeded in secret to destroy any evidence of his actual detention and left 
him for dead in the middle of nowhere. Even after the U.S. extraordinary 
rendition program was exposed, the United States failed to account for its 
mistakes in the al Masri case and control the public relations backlash.
Osama Nasr (Abu Omar): Shoddy Tradecraft
Abu Omar's case is particularly illustrative of the perpetual challenge of 
maintaining secrecy when executing covert actions such as extraordinary 
renditions. Abu Omar was detained in Milan, Italy in 2003 and rendered 
to Cairo, Egypt via U.S. airbases in both Italy and Germany. He was resid-
ing in Italy after having been granted refugee status because it was 
believed that if he returned to his native Egypt, he would be ill-treated, 
based on his history as a radical, outspoken religious cleric. Much is pres-
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ently known about his case because there were several witnesses to his 
capture, and he was able to communicate with Italian magistrates while in 
captivity in Egypt.36
Upon receiving information from Abu Omar in captivity, Italian magis-
trates started tracking leads, such as mobile phone and flight records, 
around the time of his capture. After a rigorous investigation, they 
exposed an obvious truth: U.S. operatives did not cover their tracks.37 
During the course of the investigation, Italian police raided houses and 
found personnel dossiers, fake identity cards, and U.S. passports. They 
also used phone records and wiretaps to synchronize the abduction with a 
U.S.-operated flight out of Aviano Airbase. Some of the operatives didn't 
even use false names, which made it extremely easy for the magistrates to 
identify personnel captured on closed-circuit cameras.38 Further investi-
gation uncovered a broader conspiracy, as evidence of collusion between 
U.S. and Italian secret services was discovered along with receipts to 
nefarious journalists being paid to distribute misleading information.
The end result was damning evidence that the United States was involved 
in Abu Omar's capture, and indictments for U.S. citizens were issued by 
the Italian Government. In November of 2009, the Italian Government 
convicted twenty-two of the suspected U.S. operatives and one U.S. Air 
Force officer in absentia—the first convictions related to the extraordinary 
rendition program by any foreign government.
The careless tradecraft of U.S. personnel led to the unraveling of the 
entire U.S. extraordinary rendition apparatus. Investigators were able to 
show not only how Abu Omar was captured, but also the developed net-
work of planes, flight plans, and transfers that led to his arrival in Egypt. 
Furthermore, they were able to understand how the United States was 
able to secure partnerships with European intelligence services to affect 
detentions on their territory.39 Just as with Germany in the Al Masri case, 
U.S. relations with Italy soured when the public learned the extent of the 
details surround the Abu Omar case.
Extraordinary Rendition: Recommendations
Refine Tactical and Operational Tradecraft
The failed cases described in this article exposed major weaknesses in the 
ability of the United States to successfully execute a broadly scoped 
extraordinary rendition policy. U.S. officials failed to properly cover their 
tracks during several renditions and left far too much evidence behind 
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that implicated the United States Government. The actions of certain 
operatives were amateur at best and not reflective of the high standards 
normally ascribed to U.S. clandestine operations. Given the high political 
risk of a failed or exposed rendition, the United States should only assign 
its most seasoned veterans and proven operators to conduct extraordi-
nary renditions. At a minimum, the United States must review its tactical 
and operational procedures to establish a set of best practices to be used 
for future extraordinary renditions and codify these results as a doctrine. 
By learning from the mistakes prevalent throughout the al Masri and Abu 
Omar cases, U.S. officials can amend their operational procedures accord-
ingly and maintain a high degree of secrecy.
Ensure Presidential Approval of all Extraordinary 
Rendition Targets
After 9/11, the use of rendition increased. One way to combat mission 
creep and prevent potential erroneous renditions is to return the author-
ity to render a potential target back to the President by rescinding the 
Presidential Directive issued shortly after 9/11. The intelligence commu-
nity, using credible sources and methods, can develop an interagency list 
of vetted targets for rendition and allow the President to approve or deny 
specific cases. This would allow the President and his staff to follow up on 
any intelligence shown within the targeting packets and corroborate it 
using all source intelligence and a formal legal review process. The chal-
lenge of creating an agreed-upon interagency list of targets would be diffi-
cult, but it is essential going forward to prevent erroneous rendition and 
mitigate potential fallout for political leaders.
Render Detainees to Known Detention Facilities Only and 
Frequently Monitor Them to Prevent Torture
This article makes an important distinction between the act of extraordi-
nary rendition and torture. However, the case studies demonstrate that 
there is a perceptible linkage between the two in the public consciousness 
because stories of abuse have become common.40 To sever this linkage, 
the United States must only render individuals to known detention facili-
ties and monitor their detention to prevent torture. Rather than simply 
seeking verbal assurances from partner nations, the United States Gov-
ernment should implement a policy of "trust, but check" on its allies who 
agree to hold captives taken as part of this program.
The United States Government should also closely scrutinize where it 
decides to render suspects and should favor countries with a developed 
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legal apparatus that might be able to convict the detainee. Even in suc-
cessful renditions, evidence gained through torture—while possibly pro-
viding some immediate operational value—simply becomes unusable if 
the evidence ever becomes part of a legal proceeding—civil, military, or 
otherwise. Therefore, monitoring a detainee's condition over time, and 
possibly allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to 
verify a detainee's condition, would allay the fears of opponents who 
argue that the United States knowingly outsources torture in violation of 
international laws.
Discontinue the Use of U.S.-Operated "Black Sites"
The original intent of the extraordinary rendition program was never to 
detain individuals indefinitely in U.S.-run facilities. Rather, it was to 
deliver captives to face legal proceedings in a third-party country. 
Therefore, the United States should cease all current and future use of 
"black sites" in favor of delivering captives to countries where they can 
ultimately face legal prosecution. Such a policy would protect U.S. 
political leadership from fallout, conserve considerable resources, and 
help the United States regain its domestic and international legal and 
moral footing.
Provide Full Legal Protection for Detainees 
When Appropriate
In matters of national security and in order to secure a nation, govern-
ments restrict certain legal rights from time to time. This is an unfortu-
nate but necessary reality when fighting modern terrorism. However, the 
United States should limit these restrictions wherever possible and afford 
rights to the accused depending on the circumstances and intelligence 
involved. Much of the terrorist fight can be won by using traditional legal 
procedures to openly convict criminals. This may mean the establishment 
of an ad hoc terrorist tribunal system that hears certain cases and pro-
vides basic functions, such as legal counsel and allowing detainees to view 
certain evidence that is being held against them. Some of these adjust-
ments are relatively simple, but would help immensely to regain the 
moral standing that the United States enjoyed immediately after 9/11.
Conclusion
There are benefits and pitfalls associated with extraordinary rendition 
policy. To be sure, the current policy does provide the necessary frame-
work (diplomatically and legally, from a U.S. perspective) and logistical 
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apparatus for pulling terrorists off the streets, which is extremely valuable 
as a counterterrorism tool, where legal processes lag far behind agile ter-
rorist networks. However, it is susceptible to overuse, cases of mistaken 
identity, and does challenge basic U.S. values. Furthermore, botched pol-
icy implementation can lead to public relations crises and strained alli-
ances, as evidenced by the al Masri and Abu Omar cases. However, as 
argued up front, U.S. counterterrorism officials should not dismiss 
extraordinary rendition policy because its drawbacks do not conclusively 
undermine its efficacy. To the contrary, with the adjustments to current 
policy suggested here, the United States should reevaluate how it imple-
ments the policy on a tactical, operational, and strategic level and amend 
it to ensure its continued relevance as a useful tool in the fight against ter-
rorism. This fact has been recognized by the current U.S. Presidential 
administration because it provides flexibility and agility to detain terror-
ists in cases where an attack is forthcoming and when the legal process is 
slow to react, but formal policy changes haven't been communicated by 
the administration.41 Only time will tell if these recommendations—in 
some form—are leveraged by the administration to preserve extraordi-
nary rendition.
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